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Global warming has been regarded as a global public bad in most studies. However, 
new evidence shows that some countries may actually benefit from increased 
agricultural produce through a warmer temperature.  This warrants a new type of 
analysis. In this thesis, we assume that global warming is not necessarily a global 
public bad and for some countries, global warming may be instead a public good. We 
also assume that some or all countries may be altruistic — in the sense that they may 
have concern for other countries’ welfare. We examine the implications of these 
assumptions and compare the actual emissions levels of each country with the 
respective Pareto optimal levels in a two-country model.  
 
 We then extend our analysis to a multi-country model where one type of 
countries are hurt by global warming while the other type benefit from it. We consider 
the impact on total emission levels as we have more and more altruistic countries. We 
also examine the effect on welfare of each type of country. Specifically, we analyze 
who will benefit and who will lose by the action(s) of the altruist(s). We also assume 
that there are more countries that are harmed by global warming rather than benefit 
from it and each unit of emissions harms a country more than it benefits the other type 
of country. When there are one or more altruistic countries, we find that total 
emissions are lower even though the remaining non-altruists that are hurt by global 
warming increase its emissions as a response to the reduction of emissions by the 
altruist(s). Non-altruists of those countries that are harmed by global warming gain 
while the other type of non-altruists (those that benefit from global warming) lose by 
the action(s) of the altruist(s). The total emission level will be Pareto optimal only 
when all countries in the world are altruistic.     (500 words limit) 
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1.1 Motivation of this thesis and some literature review 
 
What has been of paramount concern over the past decades in environmental issues is 
one of global warming. The issue of global warming and climate change has long 
captivated the attention of environmentalists, policymakers and economists as it has 
repercussions on future generations. It is an important issue for environmentalists as 
global warming will affect the state of the environment — the flora and fauna, and the 
quality of the air that the future generations will inherit. Economists and policymakers 
are more concerned over the monetary aspects of environmental damages and 
production loss caused by global warming. 
 
 The main bulk of the literature consists of studies that assume firstly, global 
warming is a global public bad and secondly; agents/countries are non-altruistic who 
maximize their own welfare. However, new evidence shows that some countries may 
actually benefit from increased agricultural crop produce. In addition, altruistic 
behavior among agents/countries is being observed. This warrants a new type of 
analysis which is lacking in the existing literature. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, not many papers/studies link altruism and the environmental problem of 
global warming in a single model framework. With the exception of some papers that 
are based on either assuming asymmetry of global warming, (see e.g., Martin et al. 
(1993)) or assuming altruistic behavior in the framework, (see e.g., Hoel (1991) and 
Johansson (2005)), there are not many studies that have both assumptions in place 
(except a paper by Caplan et. al (1999)). The purpose of this thesis seeks to fill in the 
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gap, that is, to study the old environmental problem of global warming in a new 
perspective by incorporating both assumptions that global warming is not necessarily 
a global public bad and global warming may instead be a public good. We also 





1.2.1 Direct relationship between industrial goods production and emissions level 
 
Industrial goods production emits greenhouse gases (GHG) such as carbon dioxide as 
a by-product. Given that the emitting rate of carbon emissions is higher than the 
absorption rate of carbon dioxide by the ocean sink, the atmospheric stock of 
greenhouse gases after decades or centuries of accumulation will cause a greenhouse 
effect which is most commonly known as global warming. Currently, about 7.1 
gigatonnes (Gt) of carbon are being emitted into the atmosphere per year and only 
about 2 Gt/year of carbon dioxide is being absorbed by the ocean sink. Out of this 7.1 
Gt of carbon, carbon emissions from fossil fuels make up 5.4 Gt and emissions from 
deforestation and land use make up the other 1.6 Gt (IPCC reports, 1993). Global 
warming has often been associated with high emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) 
as such accumulation of gases in the earth’s atmosphere prevents the sun’s warmth 
from escaping out of the atmosphere.  
  
 The greenhouse gases concentration in the future depends upon the magnitude 
of human activities (for example, deforestation, industrial production, etc.) that give 
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rise to emissions and the biospheric process of greenhouse gases ‘feedbacks’. There is 
a direct and positive relationship between industrial goods production and greenhouse 
gases level as greenhouse gases are emitted along with industrial production. High 
levels of industrial production will inevitably give rise to more greenhouse gases and 
lead to a higher accumulation of the carbon stock unless there is a major technology 
breakthrough that can reduce carbon emissions to a minimal when fossil fuels are 
burnt. Continuation of present day high level of emissions will result in higher 
concentrations of greenhouse gases in the future and there is a cause of alarm for 
immediate intervention to regain control of the situation before it is too late. 
 
 Global warming has public good (or more appropriately, public bad) 
characteristics — namely, being non-rivalry and non-excludable in nature. It is non-
rivalry as the stock of greenhouse gases that leads to global warming is available in 
equal quantity to all countries although the effects of global warming are not 
symmetric to all affected countries. It is non-excludable as no country can be kept out 
from the effects. The two base-line evaluations are the business-as-usual (BAU) 
scenario and the full-cooperation case. The business-as-usual (BAU) case involves 
welfare optimization under the assumption that there are no emissions controls at all 
since the harmful effects of pollutants (GHG in this case) are taken lightly. A full-
cooperative solution would result if a central planner were to optimize the welfares of 
all countries with respect to the control of transboundary pollution, that is, the 
summation of all the countries’ marginal damage is equated to each country’s 
marginal cost. This condition is also known as the Samuelson (1954) condition for 
public goods. In terms of global transboundary externality, a supra-national body has 
to act as a single entity and maximize global welfare but in reality, such an institution 
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is absent. Taken together, the total welfare of every country is maximized under full 
cooperation rather than under any other solution concept. However, full cooperation is 
purely a point of reference and by no means an equilibrium. There are two reasons for 
this — firstly, even though full cooperation implies that total welfare is maximized, it 
does not mean that each country is better off individually. Some countries may even 
lose out under cooperation unless the gains from cooperation are redistributed. Again, 
this will mean the need of a supra-national body to distribute side-payments from 
countries which gain under an agreement to countries which lose out. Secondly, there 
is an incentive to free-ride and to take advantage of other countries’ greenhouse gases 
abatement efforts. Due to the nature of a public bad, countries can get to enjoy the 
benefits of a reduction in greenhouse gases build-up without having to participate in 
mitigation or abatement efforts, hence free-riding poses a threat to the breakdown of 
any environment agreement. It is incorrect to think that BAU would result if no 
pollution agreement were reached; each country ought to abate for the sake of 
economic efficiency such that marginal costs equal marginal benefits of abatement 
(Barrett, 1995). The Nash equilibrium has been put forward to be the equilibrium 
outcome that will result in the absence of cooperation. In this context, Nash 
equilibrium is achieved when each and every country chooses the optimal abatement 









1.2.2 Global warming may be a global public good or bad 
 
 
Global warming has always been associated with the negative effects it will bring, 
hence it has always been regarded as a public bad for most countries. However, recent 
studies show that global warming may be a global public good for some countries that 
actually benefit from increased agricultural produce through a warmer temperature. 
The remaining paragraphs that follow will establish that global warming may not 
necessarily be a global public bad, and instead be a public good to some countries. 
The asymmetry arises because of the geographic locations of the countries such that 
global warming benefits some regions whilst it hurts the others.  Global warming is 
considered as a global public good or bad depending on which scientific reports one 
believes in. Indeed, there have been controversy as to whether global warming 
‘harms’ or ‘benefits’ countries as the effects of global warming vary by regions over 
the next century. Climate change caused by global warming is likely to affect crop 
yields adversely in some regions and favorably in others.  Put it more specifically, on 
one hand, a group of countries or regions within countries may actually benefit from 
global warming (through gains in agriculture due to enhanced carbon dioxide, CO2) 
fertilization of C3 grain crops and longer growing seasons (Easterling et al. 1989)) 
and on the other, it may hurt another group of countries through unfavorable weather 
conditions that affects crop yields adversely. Many coastal areas will, as a result of 
climate change will experience increased levels of flooding, accelerated erosion, 
seawater intrusion into freshwater sources and loss of wetlands and mangroves. All 





1.2.2.1    Climate effects on crop yields 
 
Using the results of a climate experiment with a model developed by the Goddard 
Institute for Space Studies1 (GISS), a study was carried out to examine the effects of 
global warming on crop yields in several regions around the world (Parry and Carter, 
1988). The authors compared the average yields expected under current climate 
conditions with average yields that resulted with global warming, holding in each case 
the same agricultural technology. It was found that countries or regions that actually 
benefit from global warming through increased production in agriculture are located 
primarily at middle or higher latitudes while the countries that are hurt by global 
warming are usually located near the equator. Global warming has adverse yield 
effects because higher temperatures increase evapo-transpiration, thus reducing the 
water supply available to plants. For regions where available water is not a major 
constraint, such as in Northern Europe and Japan, crop yields could increase. At 
middle and high latitudes, it was found that there is substantial lengthening of the 
growing season and that the warmer conditions would be expected to give higher 
yields. Yields in northern Japan would be roughly equivalent to those of the best 
(warmest) year experienced and in Finland, yields would be approximately doubled of 
those experienced during the best decade of this century. In Iceland, yields would be 
roughly four times the average for the best ten years since 1930 (Parry and Carter, 
1988). 
 
 In a separate study by Bach (1979), it was pointed out that warmer, drier 
weather conditions are detrimental to corn production, and that United States corn 
                                                
1 The GISS general circulation model (GCM) of the global atmosphere is one of several now in use to 
study climate change. 
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production could decline by 11 percent per degree increase in mean maximum 
summer temperature and by 1.5 percent for each 10 percent reduction in summer 
precipitation.  A uniform 1 degree Celsius warming combined with a 10 percent 
decrease in growing-season precipitation would cause yields of North Dakota spring 
wheat to decline by 12 percent and the yields of Iowa corn and soybeans would 




1.2.3 Meaning of altruism and how does altruistic behavior arise 
 
It is important to understand the meaning of altruism since it has always been 
assumed that individuals or countries are selfish as a starting point of analysis in most 
economic studies. However, we know that some individuals or countries are altruistic 
and they do care about their counterpart to certain, albeit limited, extent through the 
observations of charitable giving and rich countries giving aids to the poor countries.  
 
 The definition of altruism from Merriam-Webster’s collegiate dictionary is the 
unselfish regard for or devotion to the welfares of others. An altruistic country in this 
thesis is defined as one that will be concerned about the other country’s well-
being/welfare apart from its own. This would mean that the altruistic country’s 
welfare function depends positively on the welfares of the others. When a country is 
altruistic, it will maximize its own welfare and the welfares of the other countries. The 
concept of altruism has been explored and analyzed in existing studies and these 
include the analysis of individual behavior within families (Becker 1981) and charity 
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(Andreoni 1989, 1990). Becker (1981) had looked into altruism in the family and he 
defined an altruistic individual to be one whose own utility function depends 
positively on the well-being of the other individual, that is, the utility function of the 
individual is a function of the utility of the other’s function. Andreoni (1989, 1990) 
had identified pure and impure altruism in his analysis of public good provision. 
According to him, individuals who only care about the total amount of the public 
good produced are motivated by pure altruism while some individuals are motivated 
by the  ‘warm-glow’ of having contributed. The combination of such ‘warm-glow’ 
effect and the concern over the total supply of public good is defined as impure 
altruism. Specifically, Andreoni terms impure altruism as follows: the utility of 
individuals is not affected by the utility of other individuals per se, but where people 
get a “warm-glow” from the pure act of giving. In this setting, a person A gets utility 
from contributing money to the fund for the provision of public good, but his utility is 
unaffected by the fact that another individual B contributes money to the provision of 
the public good. By contrast, in the pure altruism model, the altruistic person A would 
get the same utility from an equal contribution by another individual B as from his 
own contribution.  
 
 Altruism is introduced formally in a two-country model in chapter 2 but we 
shall now proceed and briefly examine how altruistic behavior may arise. The 
question at the back of our mind is that “is there really such a thing called altruistic 
behavior? Skepticism about the possibility of altruism is not unusual, both among 
laymen and scholars. Altruistic behavior may arise since altruistic motives may be a 
source of satisfaction — individuals or countries may actually derive satisfaction from 
seeing other parties made better off through their own altruistic actions. Altruistic 
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behavior is regarded as fulfilling one’s duties or performing ethical acts and it arises 
since it is morally right to be altruistic even though it would not be efficient; that is, 
where its benefits did not outweigh its costs (Kelman, 1981). 
 
 
1.3 Structure of this thesis 
 
The balance of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 describes a simple two-
country model that is based on two assumptions that global warming may be 
beneficial to one country and detrimental to the other and countries may be altruistic. 
Comparison of the actual emissions levels of the countries when they are altruistic or 
non-altruistic with the respective Pareto optimal levels is done in chapter 3. Extending 
this into a multi-country model in chapter 4 where we have two types of countries 
(one type benefits from global warming while the other type is hurt by it), we consider 
the impact on total emissions level as we have more altruistic countries and its 
subsequent effect on welfare on each type of country. We address the issue of how the 
welfare of each type of non-altruist will then be affected, that is, who will actually 
benefit while who may lose through the action(s) of the altruists(s). The last chapter 
summarizes and concludes this paper. 
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2 A two-country model 
 
2.1 Description of the model 
 
In this chapter, we develop a two-country model to study the equilibrium emissions 
levels and the associated implications when we assume firstly, that countries may be 
altruistic and secondly, global warming benefits one country and harms the other. 
Consider a world which consists of two countries, indexed by i = 1, 2. Each country 
derives welfare, )(xv  out of consumption of its industrial good, x. Each unit of 
industrial good production gives out a unit of greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions and 
hence, GHG is a by-product of industrial goods production, x. Let G represents the 
total amount of emissions and that G affects the countries’ welfares, )(Gwi  through a 
phenomenon known as global warming (accumulation of greenhouse gases, GHG 
leads to global warming that will raise the overall temperature of the globe). Global 
warming usually causes adverse effects to the environment although we have 
acknowledged the fact that global warming may have beneficial effects to some 
countries too. Explicitly, welfare of a country, Ui (xi, G) is defined by the consumption 
of industrial good, xi and global public good (bad), G. We further assume that each 
unit of industrial goods production gives out an equivalent unit of emission. 
 
The traditional view that global warming is a public bad for most countries 
has been adopted for many existing studies. Indeed, global warming has always been 
associated with the environmental damages that it will cause. However, global 
warming need not harm all countries as it can benefit certain countries too through 
increased agricultural produce as noted in chapter 1. In this thesis, we assume that the 
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stock of GHG, G that ultimately leads to global warming may be a public good or 
public bad for one of the countries. Furthermore, global warming being a global 
public good (or bad) with characteristics of non-excludability and non-rivalry will be 
available in equal quantity for both countries, hence it is represented as G without any 
subscript. Global warming is coined as a global issue as it involves internalizing the 
transboundary externality apart from only the (domestic) intraboundary externality. 
In explicit terms, welfare function of country i is represented by ),( GxU ii  satisfying: 
 
Assumption 1: )()(),( GwxvGxU iiii +=  
 
 G, being a non-excludable and non-rivalry public good (bad) will affect both 
countries’ welfares; hence G enters the utility function, ),( GxU ii  without any 
subscript. 
 
Assumption 2: )(xv  is a nondecreasing, strictly concave function on an interval I 
such that Ix∈  and there exists a x  such that 0/)( =∂∂ xxv  which means that no 
country will find it advantageous to emit beyond x . 
 
 There is a direct relationship between G and x as both G and x moves in the 
same direction — more industrial production of x will inevitably produce more GHG. 
G, the total emissions, is given by the summation of emissions in each country. We 
interpret x  as follows: x  represents industrial output as well as greenhouse gases 
emissions since it is assumed that each unit of industrial output gives out a unit of 








ixG  for i = 1, 2 
 
Each unit of increment to the stock of greenhouse gases, G caused by country 
i’s industrial production, x not only affects country i’s welfare but also the 
neighboring country’s welfare as well.  
 
 We further assume that global warming is beneficial to country 1 and 
detrimental to country 2 and this means that the stock of greenhouse gases (GHG) is a 
global public good for country 1 and a global public bad for country 2. Stated 
formally, we have: 
 
Assumption 4: G is a public good for country 1, therefore, )(1 Gw  is a nondecreasing, 
strictly concave function on an interval H such that HG∈ . We also assume that each 
unit of G will not further increase the welfare of country 1 when total emissions, G is 
beyond a certain level, x .  That means, 0/)(1 =∂∂ GGw  for xG ≥ . 
 
Assumption 5:  G is a public bad for country 2, therefore, )(2 Gw  is a nonincreasing, 
strictly concave function on an interval H such that HG∈ . 
 
Assumption 6: Each unit of G hurts country 2 more than it benefits country 1 which 




 This is a reasonable assumption since global warming has always been 
associated with the adverse effects that it will cause and as such, it is more plausible 




A country i is altruistic if its objective function is to maximize its own welfare as well 




),(),( GxUGxU iiii )()()()( GwxvGwxv iiii −− +++   
 
subject to the constraint:  
 
(2.2)   ii xxG −+=  
 





A country i is non-altruistic if its objective function is to maximize it own welfare as 
defined by: 
 




subject to the constraint (2.4):  
 
(2.4)  ii xxG −+=  
 
 where i = 1, 2. Specifically, when i = 1, -i = 2 and when i = 2, -i = 1. 
 
 
2.1.1 Business-as-usual (BAU) scenario 
 
Digressing from the discussion of the two-country model, the business-as-usual 
(BAU) scenario is discussed briefly here as such a scenario had been the focus in 
earlier studies in the literature. In the BAU scenario, the problem of global warming is 
treated lightly and a country’s optimization problem is to maximize )()( ii xvxU = . 
This means that the externality problem of global warming caused by the emissions of 
the country is ignored. It follows from the first-order condition (FOC) of the above 
optimization problem that 0/)(/)( =∂∂=∂∂ iiiiii xxvxxU  and this means that a 
country will  keep on producing and polluting at a a level such that the marginal value 
of doing so is zero. We will examine the optimization solutions of the two countries 
under two different modes of behavior — altruistic or non-altruistic. Different modes 
of behavior will give the respective industrial output levels and emissions levels and 
hence, determine the total emissions levels. That is, different modes of behavior will 
give different equilibrium outcomes. Here, it is of interests to examine four cases, 





Case (1), where none of them is altruistic and both countries have the same 
optimization problem which is to maximize )()( Gwxv ii +  and; 
 
Case (2), where country 1 is altruistic while country 2 is not altruistic. The altruistic 
country’s optimization problem is to maximize )()()()( GwxvGwxv iiii −− +++  (since 
an altruist’s welfare is affected by others’ welfares apart from its own) while the non-
altruistic country’s optimization problem is to maximize )()( Gwxv ii + ;  
 
Case (3), which shows the reverse case when country 1 is not altruistic while country 
2 is altruistic and; 
 
Case (4), where both countries are altruistic and both countries have the same 
optimization problem which is to maximize )()()()( GwxvGwxv iiii −− +++ ; this case 
is also known as the Pareto optimal case which we shall show later that when both 
countries are altruistic, the resulting outcome will be Pareto optimal. 
 
 Table 1 shows the different cases where countries 1 and 2 may either be 











Different cases where countries 1 and 2 may either be altruistic or non-altruistic 
 
Country 1 
 Non-altruistic Altruistic 
Non-altruistic Case 1 Case 2 
Altruistic  Case 3 Case 4 
 
 
 Each of the above-mentioned case will be discussed in detail in the next few 




3 Comparisons of the actual emissions levels with the respective Pareto  
 optimal levels in the four cases 
 
3.1  Actual emissions levels in the four cases when countries may be altruistic  or 
 non-altruistic 
 
We will examine the actual emissions levels of the countries when they are altruistic 
or non-altruistic and compare these emissions levels with the respective Pareto 
optimal levels in each case. When the actual emissions levels are different from the 
Pareto optimal (P.O.) levels, these emissions levels are inefficient allocations and 
when the emissions levels are the same as the P.O. levels, these emissions levels are 
efficient allocations. There are four cases as noted in the previous chapter. We will 
show that in the three cases where at least one of the countries is non-altruistic, the 
resulting emissions are not efficient allocations. Only in the case where both are 
altruistic will the actual emissions be efficient allocations. 
 
 The optimization problem of non-altruistic country 1 which benefits from 
global warming is to maximize its own welfare as defined by 
)()(),( 1111 GwxvGxU +=  subject to 21 xxG += . Its objective will be to maximize 
both its welfare and the neighbouring country’s welfare when it is altruistic. 
Specifically, when country 1 is altruistic, the optimization problem is given by the 
summation of its own welfare and its neighbour’s welfare and this is expressed by 
maximize )()()()(),(),( 22112211 GwxvGwxvGxUGxU +++=+ , subject to 
21 xxG += . The first-order conditions for country 1 (that benefits from global 
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warming) to the above optimization problems are given by equations (3.1) and (3.2) 
respectively: 
 


































































where 0/)(1 >∂∂ GGw  and 0/)(2 <∂∂ GGw  since it is assumed that G is beneficial to 
country 1 and G is detrimental to country 2.  
 
 From (3.1) above, since G is a public good, the first derivative of 1w  is 
positive and welfare increases with more units of that good. The LHS of the equation: 
11 /)( xxv ∂∂  is positive while the RHS of the equation: GGw ∂∂− /)(1  is negative, 
hence for a solution to exist, 11 /)( xxv ∂∂  and GGw ∂∂ /)(1  must be equal to zero. We 
have assumed that there exists a x  such that 0/)( =∂∂ xxv  and when xG ≥ , 
0/)(1 =∂∂ GGw . That is, x  is the resulting emissions level when 
0/)(/)( 111 =∂−∂=∂∂ GGwxxv . 
 
 Country 1 will keep on producing (and polluting!) until the marginal value of 
doing so is equal to zero and that happens at x . This type of equilibrium outcome 
resembles that of a business-as-usual (BAU) case since the country produces until the 
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marginal value of production equals to zero although the interpretation is different — 
in BAU, a country treats the environmental problem lightly and disregards the global 
warming problem, thus it keeps on producing and polluting without taking into 
consideration the environmental problem. However, in this case, country 1 being non-
altruistic will only take into account how G affects its welfare. As G is a public good, 
both industrial production and emissions affects country 1’s welfare positively, hence 
it will keep on producing and polluting until production (emissions) reaches x , where 
both the marginal value of production and marginal value of emission are equal to 
zero. 
 
We claim the following: 
 
Proposition 1: Country 1 over-emits when it is non-altruistic as compared to when it 
is altruistic. That is, 11 xˆx >  where 1xˆ  and 1x  denote the emissions when country 1 is 
altruistic and non-altruistic respectively.  
 
Proof: By casual inspection of equations (3.1) and (3.2), we see that the magnitude of 
the LHS of equation (3.1) is lower than that of equation (3.2) since the first derivative 
of v is equal to zero in equation (3.1). Hence, following from the strict concavity of 
the v function, we have 11 xˆx > . Strict concavity ensures that the surface of the 
function v  be bowl-shaped and that there is no flat portion (plane). On one hand, 
should 11 xˆx > , this implies that 1111 ˆ/)ˆ(/)( xxvxxv ∂∂<∂∂ ; on the other hand, if 
11 xˆx < , this implies that 1111 ˆ/)ˆ(/)( xxvxxv ∂∂>∂∂ . If 11 xˆx >  does not hold when 
1111 ˆ/)ˆ(/)( xxvxxv ∂∂<∂∂  and 11 xˆx <  is not true when 1111 ˆ/)ˆ(/)( xxvxxv ∂∂>∂∂ , the 
assumption that the v  function is strictly concave will be violated.  
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 Proposition 1 has an intuitive interpretation. When country 1 (benefits from 
global warming) is non-altruistic, it does not take into account how G, the total 
emissions will affect country 2 adversely but when it is altruistic, it will take into 
consideration how G will positively affect itself and negatively affect its neighboring 
country. It is straightforward to see that emissions will be higher when it is non-
altruistic as compared to when it is altruistic. 
 
Proposition 2:  Country 2 (hurt by global warming) under-emits when it is non-
altruistic as compared to when it is altruistic.  
 
Proof:  Country 2 will maximize )()( 22 Gwxv +  when it is non-altruistic and it will 
maximize )()()()( 2211 GwxvGwxv +++  when it is altruistic. The two first-order 



































 Solving equations (3.3) and (3.4) give the respective optimal emissions levels, 
2x  and 2xˆ . By casual inspection of equations (3.3) and (3.4), we see that the 
magnitude of the LHS of equation (3.3) is greater than that of equation (3.4) since 
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)(2 Gw  is a steeper function than )()( 21 GwGw + . Following from the strict concavity 
of the v function, we have 22 xˆx <  where 2x  and 2xˆ  are the emissions of country 2 
when it is non-altruistic and altruistic respectively.  
 
 Intuitively, since G, the total emissions, is harmful to non-altruistic country 2, 
the country will under-emit as compared to when it is altruistic since it did not take 
into account how G will benefit its neighboring country 1.  
 
 
3.1.1 Actual allocations when both countries are non-altruistic (case 1) 
 
Proposition 3: Let 1x  and 2x  represent the emissions levels of countries 1 and 2 when 
they are non-altruistic. Non-altruistic country 1 will emit more than non-altruistic 
country 2. That is, 21 xx > . 
 
Proof:  By inspection, it can be seen from equations (3.1) and (3.3) that 
<∂∂ 11 /)( xxv 22 /)( xxv ∂∂  since the RHS of (3.1): 0/)(1 =∂∂− GGw  and the RHS of 
(3.3): GGw ∂∂− /)(2  is a positive number. Therefore, we have RHS of (3.3) being 
larger than that of (3.1).  To reiterate why 0/)(1 =∂∂− GGw , we reproduce the earlier 
explanation as given in section (3.1) in pg 17 here: from (3.1) above, since G is a 
public good, the first derivative of 1w  is positive and welfare increases with more 
units of that good. The LHS of the equation: 11 /)( xxv ∂∂  is positive while the RHS of 
the equation: GGw ∂∂− /)(1  is negative, hence for a solution to exist, 11 /)( xxv ∂∂  and 
GGw ∂∂ /)(1  must be equal to zero. We assume that there exists a x  such that 
0/)( =∂∂ xxv  and when xG ≥ , 0/)(1 =∂∂ GGw . That is, x  is the resulting 
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emissions level when 0/)(/)( 111 =∂−∂=∂∂ GGwxxv . We show why GGw ∂∂− /)(2  
is a positive number - Being a public bad to country 2, we have 0/)(2 <∂∂ GGw  and 
as such 0/)(2 >∂∂− GGw . 
 
 As <∂∂ 11 /)( xxv 22 /)( xxv ∂∂ , it then follows from the strict concavity of the v 
function that 21 xx > .  
 
 
3.1.2  Pareto optimal level of emissions in the case when both countries are 
 non-altruistic (case 1) 
 
Let *1x  and 
*
2x  be the Pareto optimal emissions levels in the case that both countries 
are non-altruistic. The Pareto optimal levels of emissions are given by finding the 
emission levels that maximize the social welfare (as defined by the sum of the two 
non-altruistic countries’ welfares). Pareto optimality means that when total welfare is 
maximized, there is no way a country can be made better off without making the other 
country worse off. Another equivalent way to describe Pareto optimality is that there 
is no way to make both better off. It must be pointed out that the full-cooperative 
allocation corresponds to a Pareto optimal outcome as total welfare is maximized and 
this means that each of the two countries’ welfares is maximized. The full cooperative 
outcome is the outcome that would arise if there were a social planner or 
supranational body with great political and economic power to implement the desired 
allocation that maximizes the welfares of the two countries. We represent the social 
welfare in this case as 1SW . The optimization problem is: 
 
(3.5)  211, 21
max UUSW
xx
+= )()()()( 2211 GwxvGwxv +++=  
 




(3.6)  21 xxG +=  
 
where )()( 111 GwxvU +=  is the welfare of non-altruistic country 1 and 
)()( 222 GwxvU +=  is the welfare of non-altruistic country 2. The two first-order 
conditions are respectively: 
 






































where *1x  and 
*
2x  are the optimal emissions levels given by solving the first-order 
conditions in (3.7) and (3.8) respectively.  
 
































Proposition 4: Assumptions 1-5 from chapter 2 imply that the Pareto optimal levels 
of emissions in the two non-altruistic countries are equal. That is, **2
*
1 xxx == . 
 
Proof: Suppose not, and let 1x  and 2x  be the solutions of equation (3.9) and that  
21 xx ≠ . By strict concavity of the functions )( ixv  and )(Gwi , equation (3.9) does 
not hold unless 21 xx = . Strict concavity ensures that the surfaces of the v  and iw  
functions be bowl-shaped and that there is no flat portion (plane). If 21 xx ≠  does not 




3.1.3 Comparison of the Pareto optimal allocations with the actual allocations 
when both countries are non-altruistic (case 1) 
 
Proposition 5: When both countries 1 and 2 are non-altruistic, the actual emissions 
are not Pareto optimal. 
 
Proof: The solution to the optimization problem of non-altruistic country 1 is to find 
the emissions level that maximize )()( 11 Gwxv +  while the Pareto optimal solution of 
country 1 is given by differentiating )()()()( 22111` GwxvGwxvSW +++=  with 
respect to 1x . Let 1x , 2x  denote the actual emissions when both countries 1 and 2 are 
non-altruistic and let *1x , 
*
2x  represent the Pareto optimal emissions levels of country 









(3.7):  )/)(/)((/)( 2111 GGwGGwxxv ∂∂+∂∂−=∂∂  
 
 Solving (3.1) gives 1x , the emissions level of non-altruistic country 1 and 
solving (3.7) gives *1x , the Pareto optimal emissions level of country 1 (note that the 
value of G in (3.1) and (3.7) may not be the same). By casual inspection, we can 
easily infer that the first-order conditions (3.1) and (3.7) will not lead to the same 
solution. That is, we have *1 xx ≠ . Specifically, from section 3.1, 11 /)( xxv ∂∂  in (3.1) 
is equal to zero and this is lower than *1
*
1 /)( xxv ∂∂  in (3.7). It is assumed that there 
exists a x  such that 0/)( =∂∂ xxv . Following from the strict concavity of the v 
function, it follows that *1xx > .  
 
 Similarly, the solution to the optimization problem of non-altruistic country 2 
is to maximize )()( 22 Gwxv +  while the Pareto optimal solution of country 2 is given 
by differentiating )()()()( 22111 GwxvGwxvSW +++=  with respect to 2x . The two 
first-order conditions are given in (3.3) and (3.8) respectively, that is, we have (3.3): 
GGwxxv ∂−∂=∂∂ /)(/)( 222  and (3.8): )/)(/)((/)( 2122 GGwGGwxxv ∂∂+∂∂−=∂∂  
(note that the value of G in equations (3.3) and (3.8) may not be the same). Solving 
(3.3) gives 2x , the emissions level of non-altruistic country 2 and solving (3.8) gives 
*
2x , the Pareto optimal emissions level of country 2. We can easily infer that the first-
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order conditions (3.3) and (3.8) will not lead to the same solution. That is, *2 xx ≠ . 
The magnitude of the first derivative of v in equation (3.3) is higher than that in 
equation (3.8) since )(2 Gw  is a steeper function than )()( 21 GwGw + . Therefore, the 
slope of )(2 Gw  is always greater than that of )()( 21 GwGw + . It follows from the 
strict concavity of the v function that *22 xx < .    
 
Thus, when both countries are non-altruistic, Proposition 5 suggests that we 
have an inefficient outcome where the emissions are not Pareto optimal, that is, 
*
1 xx ≠  and 
*
2 xx ≠ . 
 
 
3.1.4  Actual allocations when country 1 is altruistic while country 2 is non-
 altruistic (case 2) 
 
Proposition 6: Emissions of altruistic country 1, which is altruistic and benefits from 
global warming, are higher than those of country 2, which is not altruistic and is hurt 
by global warming. That is 21 xx >  where 1x  and 2x  denote the emissions of 
countries 1 and 2. 
 
 Proof: Comparing equations (3.2) and (3.3), we see that 2211 /)(/)( xxvxxv ∂∂<∂∂ . 
Following from the strict concavity of the v function, we have 21 xx > .  
 
It may seem to be counter-intuitive that country 1 being altruistic will actually emit 
more than non-altruistic country 2 but actually this is not surprising since global 
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warming benefits country 1 while it hurts country 2 and more emissions is beneficial 
to country 1. However, country 1 will actually emit less when it is altruistic as 
compared to when it is non-altruistic and this is shown in Proposition 1 where country 
1 over-emits when it is non- altruistic as compared to when it is altruistic. 
 
3.1.5  Pareto optimal level of emissions in the case when we have altruistic 
 country 1 and non-altruistic country 2 (case 2) 
 
Let *1x  and 
*
2x  represents the Pareto optimal emissions levels in the situation where 
we have altruistic country 1 and non-altruistic country 2. The Pareto optimal 
emissions levels are given by differentiating the sum of altruistic country 1’s welfare 
and non-altruistic country 2’s welfare with respect to 1x  and 2x . We represent social 
welfare in this case as SW2. The optimization problem is: 







(3.11)  21 xxG +=  
 
where )()()()( 22111 GwxvGwxvU +++=  is the welfare of altruistic country 1 and 
)()( 222 GwxvU +=  is the welfare of non-altruistic country 2. 
 
We differentiate equation (3.10) with respect to 1x  and 2x  to solve for the 













































3.1.6 Comparison of Pareto optimal allocations with the actual allocations when 
country 1 is altruistic while country 2 is non-altruistic (case 2) 
 
Proposition 7: When country 1 is altruistic while country 2 is non-altruistic, the actual 
emissions are not Pareto optimal. 
 
Proof: Altruistic country 1’s optimization problem is to maximize 
)()()()( 2211 GwxvGwxv +++  but the Pareto optimal solution of country 1 is given 
by differentiating )()()()()()( 2222112 GwxvGwxvGwxvSW +++++=  with respect 
to 1x . Let 1x  and 2x  denote the emissions levels of altruistic country 1 and non-
altruistic country 2 respectively and let *1x  and 
*
2x  represent the Pareto optimal 
emissions levels of country 1 and 2 respectively. The resulting first-order conditions 
to the above optimization problems are given respectively by: 
 





 (3.12): )/)(2/)((/)( 2111 GGwGGwxxv ∂∂+∂∂−=∂∂ . 
  
 Solving (3.2) gives 1x , the emissions level of altruistic country 1 and solving 
(3.12) gives *1x , the Pareto optimal emissions level of country 1 (note that the value of 
G , the total emissions, in (3.2) and (3.12) may not be equal). It is straightforward to 
see that the first-order conditions will not lead to the same solution, hence we can 
state that *11 xx ≠ .  Specifically, since )()( 21 GwGw +  is a flatter function than 
)(2)( 21 GwGw + ,  the slope of )()( 21 GwGw +  is always lower than that of 
)(2)( 21 GwGw + . 11 /)( xxv ∂∂  in equation (3.2) is lower than that in equation (3.10). It 
follows from the strict concavity of the v function that *11 xx > . 
  
 Analogous reasoning can be applied to country 2. Non-altruistic country 2’s 
objective is to maximize )()( 22 Gwxv +  but the Pareto optimal solution is given by 
differentiating )()()()()()( 222211 GwxvGwxvGwxv +++++  with respect to 2x . The 
two first-order conditions are given respectively by equations (3.3): 
)(/)( 222 Gwxxv −∂=∂∂  and (3.13): )/)(/)(2/1(/)( 2122 GGwGGwxxv ∂∂+∂∂−=∂∂ . 
Solving (3.3) gives 2x , the emissions level of non-altruistic country 2 whilst solving 
(3.13) gives *2x . It is easy to deduce that the solutions to the two first-order conditions 
will not be the same. That is, *22 xx ≠ . Since )(2 Gw  is a steeper function than 
)()(2/1 21 GwGw + , the slope of )(2 Gw  is always greater than )()( 21 GwGw + . 
Therefore, it follows from the strict concavity of the v function that *22 xx < .  
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 Proposition 7 states that when only country 1 is altruistic while country 2 is 
non-altruistic, there is inefficiency — the actual emissions levels of each country, 1x  
and 2x  differ from the Pareto optimal levels, 
*
1x  and 
*
2x .   
 
 
3.1.7  Actual allocations when country 1 is non-altruistic while country 2 is 
 altruistic (case 3) 
 
Proposition 8: Let 1x  and 2x  be the emissions levels of non-altruistic country 1 and 
altruistic country 2 and let G  denotes the total emissions level. Non-altruistic country 
1 will emit more than altruistic country 2, that is, 21 xx > .   
 
Proof: Applying assumptions 2 and 6 and comparing equations (3.1) and (3.4), we 
































Applying assumption 6 where we assumed that each unit of G hurts country 2 
more than it benefits country 1: )/)(/)( 21 GGwGGw ∂−∂<∂∂ , we will have 
)/)(/)(( 21 GGwGGw ∂∂+∂∂− 0>  where 0/)(1 >∂∂ GGw  and 0/)(2 <∂∂ GGw  since 




 The marginal value of each unit of emissions in country 1, 11 /)( xxv ∂∂  is 
lower than the marginal value of each unit of emissions in country 2, 22 /)( xxv ∂∂  
since 0/)(1 =∂∂ GGw  and )/)(/)(( 21 GGwGGw ∂∂+∂∂−  is greater than zero. To 
reiterate why 0/)(1 =∂∂ GGw  in (3.1) above, since G is a public good, the first 
derivative of 1w  is positive and welfare increases with more units of that good. The 
LHS of the equation: 11 /)( xxv ∂∂  is positive since from assumption 2, we assume that 
the v function is a nondecreasing function. The RHS of the equation: GGw ∂∂− /)(1  is 
negative, hence for a solution to exist, 11 /)( xxv ∂∂  and GGw ∂∂ /)(1  must be equal to 
zero. We assume that there exists a x  such that 0/)( =∂∂ xxv  and when xG ≥ , 
0/)(1 =∂∂ GGw . That is, x  is the resulting emissions level when 
0/)(/)( 111 =∂−∂=∂∂ GGwxxv . 
 
 
Since 2211 /)(/)( xxvxxv ∂∂<∂∂ , it then follows from the strict concavity of the 
v  function that 21 xx > .  
 
The marginal value of each unit of emissions in country 1, 11 /)( xxv ∂∂  is 
lower than the marginal value of each unit of emissions in country 2, 22 /)( xxv ∂∂ . 







3.1.8 Pareto optimal level of emissions in the case when we have non-altruistic 
 country 1 and altruistic country 2 (case 3) 
 
Let *1x  and 
*
2x  represent the Pareto optimal emissions levels in the situation when we 
have altruistic country 1 and non-altruistic country 2. The Pareto optimal emissions 
levels are given by choosing the emissions levels that maximize the sum of altruistic 
country 1’s welfare and non-altruistic country 2’ welfare as represented by social 
welfare, SW3 in equation (3.15) below: 





subject to the constraint:  
 
(3.16)  21 xxG +=  
 
where )()( 111 GwxvU +=  is the welfare of non-altruistic country 1 and 
)()()()( 22112 GwxvGwxvU +++=  is the welfare of altruistic country 2. 
 
 We differentiate equation (3.15) with respect to 1x  and 2x  to obtain the Pareto 
optimal emissions levels. The two first-order conditions are respectively: 
 










































where *1x  and 
*
2x  are the resulting Pareto optimal emissions levels respectively. 
 
 
3.1.9 Comparison of Pareto optimal allocations with the actual allocations in the 
situation when country 1 is non-altruistic while country 2 is altruistic (case 3) 
 
Proposition 9: Emissions of non-altruistic county 1 and altruistic country 2 will not be 
Pareto optimal. 
 
Proof: Non-altruistic country 1’s optimization problem is to maximize its own 
welfare as defined by )()( 11 Gwxv +  while the Pareto optimal solution to country 1 is 
obtained by differentiating )()()()()()( 2211113 GwxvGwxvGwxvSW +++++=  with 
respect to 1x . Let 1x  and 2x  denote the emissions of altruistic country 1 and non-
altruistic country 2 and let *ix  and 
*
2x  represent the Pareto optimal emissions levels 
for countries 1 and 2. The two first-order conditions are represented respectively by 
equations: 
 




(3.17):  )/)(2/1/)((/)( 2111 GGwGGwxxv ∂∂+∂∂−=∂∂  
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 Solving (3.1) gives 1x , the emissions level of country 1 and solving (3.16) 
gives *1x , the Pareto optimal emissions level of country 1 (note that the value of G, the 
total emissions, in (3.1) and (3.17) may not be the same). Comparing the two first-
order conditions (3.1) and (3.17), we know that the respective solutions are not the 
same. That is, *11 xx ≠ . Specifically, since 11 /)( xxv ∂∂  in equation (3.1) is assumed to 
be equal to zero, its magnitude is lower than that in equation (3.17). We assume that 
there exists a x  when 0/)( =∂∂ xxv . It follows from the strict concavity of the v  
function that *1xx >
r .  
 
 Similarly, altruistic country 2’s optimization problem is to maximize 
)()()()( 2211 GwxvGwxv +++  while the Pareto optimal solution to country 2 is given 
by differentiating )()()()()()( 221111 GwxvGwxvGwxv +++++  with respect to 2x . 
The two first-order conditions are represented respectively as equations (3.4) and 
(3.18) below: 
 




(3.18):  )/)(/)(2(/)( 2122 GGwGGwxxv ∂∂+∂∂−=∂∂  
 
 Solving (3.4) gives 2x , the emissions level of altruistic country 2 and solving 
(3.18) gives *2x , the Pareto optimal emissions level of country 2 (note that G , the 
total emissions, in (3.4) and (3.18) may not be equal). Clearly, the first-order 
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conditions will not lead to the same solution. Therefore, *22 xx ≠ . Since 
)()( 21 GwGw +  is a steeper function than )()(2 21 GwGw + , the slope of 
)()( 21 GwGw +  is always greater than that of )()(2 21 GwGw + . Therefore, it follows 
from the strict concavity of the v function that *22 xx < .  )()( 21 GwGw +  is a steeper 
function than )()(2 21 GwGw +  since we have assumed previously that )(1 Gw  is a 
nondecreasing function and )(2 Gw  is a nonincreasing function. Mathematically, we 
will have )()( 21 GwGw +  being a steeper function than )()(2 21 GwGw + , as such the 
slope of )()( 21 GwGw +  will be greater than that of )()(2 21 GwGw + . The relationship 
between )()( 21 GwGw +  and GGwGGw ∂∂+∂∂ /)(/)( 21  is that 
GGwGGw ∂∂+∂∂ /)(/)( 21  is the first derivative of )()( 21 GwGw + .  
 
 When only one country is altruistic while the other is non-altruistic, the 
resulting total emissions will not be Pareto optimal and this is an inefficient outcome. 
 
 
3.1.10  Actual allocations when both countries are altruistic (case 4) 
 
Proposition 10: Let 1x  and 2x  represent the emissions levels of altruistic countries 1 
and 2. Emissions levels in both altruistic countries are equal, 21 xx = . 
 
































∂   
 
 Following from the strict concavity of the v, w1 and w2 functions, we have 
21 xx = .   
 
 
3.1.11   Pareto optimal level of emissions in the case when we have altruistic  
    countries 1 and 2 (case 4) 
 
The Pareto optimal levels of emissions in this case are given by solving for the 
emissions levels that will maximize the sum of the two altruistic countries’ welfares 
as represented by social welfare, SW4 in (3.20) below: 
  
(3.20) 







(3.21)  21 xxG +=  
 
where )()()()( 22111 GwxvGwxvU +++=  is the welfare of altruistic country 1 and 
)()()()( 22112 GwxvGwxvU +++=  is the welfare of altruistic country 2.  
 
The two first-order conditions are respectively: 
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Proposition 11: Let *1x  and 
*
2x  be the Pareto optimal emissions levels when both 
countries are altruistic. Pareto optimal emissions will be equal for both countries, that 
is, **2
*
1 xxx == . 
 







































3.1.12  Comparison of Pareto optimal allocations with the actual allocations in 
 the situation when both countries are altruistic (case 4) 
 
Proposition 12: 1x  and 2x , the emissions of countries 1 and 2 are equal to the Pareto 
optimal (P.O.) levels. That is, *21 xxx == . 
 
Proof: The social planner’s optimization problem as shown in equation (3.20) gives 
the same first-order conditions when both countries are altruistic in section 3.1.10. It 
is straightforward to conclude that the two first-order conditions (3.22) and (3.23) 
give the same solution when both countries are altruistic. Hence, we have 
*
21 xxx == .  
  
 When both countries are altruistic, the resulting non-cooperative solution is 
Pareto optimal. Further elaboration is as follows: a full-cooperative solution is given 
by solving the social planner’s optimization problem which is Pareto optimal, that is, 
no country can be made better off without making someone else worse off since all 
countries’ welfare is maximized in a social planner scenario. A non-cooperative 
solution is given by solving each individual country’s optimization problem. In the 
two-country model, when both countries are altruistic, the resulting non-cooperative 
solution will be the same as that of the social planner’s optimization problem, hence, 
we come to the conclusion that when both countries are altruistic, the resulting non-
cooperative solution is Pareto optimal. 
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4 A multi-country model 
 
4.1 Extension to a multi-country model 
 
The simple two-country model can be extended to a multi-country model. Consider 
instead, a world with m + n countries where m symmetric countries benefit from 
global warming while n symmetric countries are hurt by it. Let country i be a member 
of m countries (that benefit from global warming) while country j is a member of n 
countries (that are hurt by it). Therefore, we assume that ( ) / 0iw G G∂ ∂ ≥  for i = 1, 2, 
3 ….., m and ( ) / 0jw G G∂ ∂ ≤  for j = 1, 2, 3 …., n. The usual assumptions in the two-
country model apply in this multi-country model. Specifically, both )(Gwi  and 
)(Gw j  are strictly concave functions where )(Gwi  is a nondecreasing function while 
)(Gw j  is a nonincreasing function on an interval H for all HG∈ ; v  is a strictly 
concave, nondecreasing function on an interval I for all Ix∈  and there exists a x  
when 0/)( =∂∂ xxv  which means that no country will find it advantageous to emit 
beyond x . We also assume that each unit of G will not further increase the welfare of 
country i when total emissions, G is beyond a certain level, x  which means that 
0/)( =∂∂ GGwi  for xG ≥ . In addition, a unit of industrial product gives out a unit of 
emissions and G, the total amount of emissions, is given by the summation of all the 












 We further assume that there are more countries that are hurt by global 
warming rather than benefit from it. That is, mn > . This seems to be a reasonable 
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assumption as the benefits that are associated with global warming have been 
downplayed by most studies and it is more plausible at this stage in time to accept the 
view that there are more countries that are actually harmed by global warming rather 
than benefit from it. We also assume that that each unit of increment in G  hurts 
country j  more than it benefits country i since it is more plausible to think that global 
warming hurts a country more than it benefits a country at this stage of time. That is, 
GGwGGw ji ∂−∂<∂∂ /)(/)( .  
 
 We raise several questions of interests here. The first question that we seek to 
address is that how the total emissions level will compare with the level when we 
have only one altruistic country i (which benefits from global warming) while the rest 
of the world remain as non-altruists and when all countries are non-altruistic. 
Consider another situation that we have one altruistic country j (which is harmed by 
global warming) while the remaining countries are non-altruistic, how the total 
emissions level will compare with the level in the situation that all countries are non-
altruistic? A related question is how this will affect the welfares of the rest of the 
world who are non-altruists and will the non-altruists be better off or worse off by the 
action of the single altruistic country? Suppose we increase the number of altruistic 
countries from one to two of the same type, how will the total emissions levels 
compare and will the welfares of the non-altruists be further improved or degraded?  
Once the direction of change in total emissions level is known, we can easily 
generalize the results when we further increase the number of countries. The last 
query is that will the total emissions level be Pareto optimal if we increase the number 




Propositions 13 to 20 will provide the answers and we shall attempt to answer the first 
question raised by proving Propositions 13 to 15 below. 
 
 
4.2 Comparison of the total emissions in the situation that all countries are non-
altruistic with the situation that there is one altruistic country i while the  rest 
of the world are non-altruistic 
 
Starting from a situation that all countries in the world are non-altruistic, we will 
examine how the total emissions level compare in the situation when there is one 
altruistic country i while the rest of the world are non-altruistic. We will also see how 
the welfares of the non-altruists compare in the above situations. We classify situation 
1 as the situation that all countries are non-altruistic and situation 2 as the situation 
that there is one altruistic country i while the remaining countries are non-altruistic. 
 
Proposition 13: Country i will emit less when it is altruistic as compared to when it is 
non-altruistic.  
 
Proof: Let ixˆ  and ix  represent the solutions to country i’s optimization problems 















)()()()( ) and when it is non-
altruistic ( )()( Gwxv ii + ) respectively. The resulting first-order conditions when 
country i are altruistic and non-altruistic are represented by equations (4.1) and (4.2) 











































 Note that the LHS of equation (4.2) is non-negative while the RHS: 
GGwi ∂∂− /)(  is negative. We know that the LHS of equation (4.2) is non-negative 
since from the assumption, v   is a strictly concave, nondecreasing function. v   is 
nondecreasing means that welfare is non-decreasing as more units of industrial 
product is consumed. For a solution to exist, LHS and RHS of equation (4.2) have to 
be equal to zero. It is assumed that there exists a x  when 0/)( =∂∂ xxv  when xG ≥ , 
0/)( =∂∂ GGwi . That is, x  is the equilibrium emissions level when 
0/)(/)( =∂−∂=∂∂ GGwxxv iii .  
 
 The magnitude of the LHS of equation (4.1) is greater than that of equation 
(4.2). Therefore, it follows from the strict concavity of the v  function that ixx ˆ> . 
Strict concavity ensures that there are no flat portions on the v  function, therefore if 
the magnitude of the first derivative of v  in equation (4.1) is greater than that in 
equation (4.2), xxi <ˆ  must be true or the assumption that v function is strictly 




 We know from Proposition 13 above that when country i is altruistic, it will 
emit less, however, we may suspect that the remaining non-altruistic countries will 
increase or reduce its emissions in response to the reduction of emissions by country i.  
In particular, those who are harmed by global warming may emit more when country i 
emits less since there is a positive relationship between emissions and industrial 
production. Those who benefit from global warming may even emit more since both 
emissions and industrial output positively affects their welfares. Will the total 
emissions be higher or lower when we have the situation that there is one altruist 
while the remaining countries are non-altruists as compared to the situation that all 
countries are non-altruists? Proposition 14 below will provide the answer. 
 
Proposition 14: 1G , total emissions, in situation 1 when all countries are non-
altruistic are higher than 2G , total emissions in situation 2 when we have one 
altruistic country i (that benefits from global warming) while the remaining countries 
are non-altruistic ( 21 GG > ). The remaining non-altruistic type i countries will emit 
the same amount, x  in both situations while type j countries will actually emit more 
in situation 2 as compared to situation 1.  
 
Proof: 1G  is given by: 
 
(4.3)  111 ji nxmxG +=  
 
where 1ix  and 
1




2G  is given by: 
 
(4.4)  2222 ˆ)1( jii nxxxmG ++−=  
 
where 2ix , 
2
jx  are the emissions level of non-altruistic country i and j respectively, and 
2ˆix  represents the emissions of country i when it is altruistic in situation 2. 
 
 Non-altruistic country i will always emit x , the maximum emissions level 
since the first-order condition to its optimization problem is 
GGwxxv iii ∂−∂=∂∂ /)(/)(  and for a solution to exist, 
0/)(/)( =∂−∂=∂∂ GGwxxv iii . We assume that there exists a x  when the first 
derivative of )( ixv  takes the value of zero. The first derivative of )(Gwi  is assumed 
to be equal to zero for values of G that is greater than or equal to x . Therefore, we can 
state that emissions in non-altruistic country i in both situations are xxx ii ==
21 . 
Using equations (4.3) and (4.4), we can represent 21 GG −  as 
 
(4.5)  =− 21 GG 11 ji nxmx + ]ˆ)1[(
222
jii nxxxm ++−−  
 
which reduces to 
 




 We will proceed to prove that 21 GG >  by contradiction. Suppose that 
21 GG ≤  is true, following from the strict concavity of the functions v  and jw , this 
implies that we have 21 jj xx ≥ . Substituting xxx ii ==
21 , 21 jj xx ≥  and 
22 ˆii xx >  (since 
ii xx ˆ>  from Proposition 13) into  equation (4.6), it is straightforward to see that 
equation (4.6) is positive, which contradicts the supposition. Therefore, 21 GG >  must 
be true. Since 21 GG > , following from the strict concavity of the v and wj functions, 
21
jj xx < .  
  
 At first sight, Proposition 14 seems to be counter-intuitive but it is not so. We 
explain why below. 1G , total emissions, in situation 1 when all countries are non-
altruistic are higher than 2G , total emissions in situation 2 when we have one 
altruistic country i (that benefits from global warming) while the remaining countries 
are non-altruistic ( 21 GG > . This is not counter-intuitive since we expect that 
emissions of altruistic country i will be lower when it is altruistic while the remaining 
countries are all non-altruistic in both situations, hence 2G  is lower than 1G . 
 
 The remaining non-altruistic countries i will emit the same amount, x  which 
is the maximum level of emissions in both situations since they have the same 
optimization problems in both situations while countries j will actually emit more in 
situation 2 as compared to situation 1. Countries j (that are hurt by global warming) 
will actually emit more in situation 2 as compared to situation 1 since total emissions, 
2G  in situation 2 is lower than total emissions, 1G  in situation 1 and by emitting 




4.2.1 Welfares of non-altruistic country i and country j in situations 1 and 2 
 
Welfare of non-altruistic country i is higher while the welfare of non-altruistic 
country j is lower in situation 1 as compared to situation 2. As shown in Proposition 
14 above, 21 GG > , total emissions are higher in situation 1 than in situation 2, this 
implies that )()( 21 GwGw ii >  as the function iw  is nondecreasing. 
  
 Therefore, we have )()()()( 21 GwxvGwxv ii +>+  since xxx ii ==
21 . In 
situation 2 when there is one altruistic country i while the rest of the world are non-
altruistic, the welfare of non-altruistic country i, )()( 1Gwxv i+  is lower. 
 
 Non-altruistic country j will emit more in situation 2 than in situation 1, that is, 
12
jj xx > . Therefore, we have )()(
12
jj xvxv >  since v function is nondecreasing. Given 
that 21 GG >  and as jw  function is nonincreasing, this implies that 
)()( 21 GwGw jj < . 
 
 We have )()()()( 2211 GwxvGwxv jjjj +<+  which means that the welfares of 
non-altruistic countries j in situation 2 are higher than in situation 1. We can thus 
conclude that when we have an altruistic country that benefits from global warming 
while the remaining countries are non-altruistic, the resulting total emissions are 






4.3 Comparison of the total emissions in the situation when all countries are non-
altruistic with the total emissions in the situation that there is one altruistic 
country j while the rest of the world are non-altruistic 
 
Conversely, we consider how the total emissions in situation 1, the situation when all 
countries are non-altruistic will compare with the total emissions in situation 3, the 
situation that there is one altruistic country j while the rest of the world are non-
altruistic.   
 
Proposition 15: Emissions of country j are lower when it is altruistic as compared to 
when it is non-altruistic, assuming that there are more countries that are harmed by 
global warming rather than benefit from it )( nm <  and each unit of G hurts country j 
more than it benefits country i, GGwGGw ij ∂∂>∂∂− /)(/)( . 
 
Proof: Let jxˆ  and jx  represent the emissions of country j when it is altruistic and 
non-altruistic respectively. When country j is altruistic, it will maximize every 
country’s welfare in the world, but when it is non-altruistic, it will only maximize its 
own welfare. Country j’s optimization problems when it is altruistic and non-altruistic 














)()()()(  and  
)()( Gwxv jj + . jxˆ  and jx , the solutions to country j’s optimization problems when it 





















































































 From the assumption that nm < , we know that 1+= mn  or 1+> mn  is true. 
Substituting 1+= mn  into (4.9’) and since GGwGGw ij ∂∂>∂∂− /)(/)( , (4.9’) 
simplifies to 
 













 We have assumed earlier in the thesis that GGwGGw ji ∂−∂<∂∂ /)(/)(  in 
page 39, therefore the expression inside the bracket of (4.10) is negative. As m is a 
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positive number, we will have )/)(/)(( GGwGGwm ji ∂∂+∂∂−  being positive. It is 
straightforward to see that (4.10) is positive which means that jj xxv ∂∂ /)(  in (4.7) is 
greater than jj xxv ∂∂ /)(  in (4.8). Following from the strict concavity of the v 
function, jj xx <ˆ .  
 
  
Proposition 16: 3G , total emissions in situation 3 are lower than 1G , total emissions 
in situation 1 where in situation 3, we have one altruistic country j while the 
remaining countries are non-altruistic and in situation 1, all countries are non-
altruistic. The remaining non-altruistic countries i will always emit the same amount 
x  in both situations while countries j will actually emit more in situation 3 as 
compared to situation 1. 
 
Proof: 1G , total emissions when all countries are non-altruistic are given by: 
 
(4.11)  111 ji nxmxG +=  
 
where 1ix  and 
1
jx  are the emissions levels of non-altruistic countries i and j in 
situation 1. 
 
 3G , total emissions when there is one altruistic country j while the rest of the 
world are non-altruistic are given by: 
 
(4.12)  jji xxnmxG ˆ)1(




where 3ix  represents the emissions of non-altruistic country i, 
3ˆ jx  and 
3
jx  denote the 
emissions levels of country j when it is altruistic and non-altruistic respectively in 
situation 3. 
 
We already know from the proof in Proposition 13 that country i when it is 
non-altruistic will always emit x . Therefore, we have xxx ii ==
31 . From equations 
(4.11) and (4.12), we can represent 31 GG −  as: 
 
(4.13)  =− 31 GG )ˆ)1(( 3311 jjiji xxnmxnxmx +−+−+  
 
which reduces to  
 
(4.13’)   333131 ˆ)()( jjjjii xxxxnxxm −+−+−  
 
We will proceed to prove that 31 GG >  by contradiction. Suppose that 
31 GG ≤  is true, following from the strict concavity of the v and wj functions, we have 
13
jj xx ≤ . Substituting xxx ii ==
31 , 13 jj xx ≤  and 
33ˆ jj xx <  (since jj xx <ˆ  from 
Proposition 15), it is straightforward to conclude that (4.13’) is positive which 
contradicts the supposition. Therefore, 31 GG >  must be true. Since 31 GG >  is 
proven to be true, following from the strict concavity of the v and wj functions, 
31





4.3.1 Welfares of non-altruistic country i and non-altruistic country j in  situations 
1 and 3 
 
When there are more countries that are hurt by global warming than benefit from it, 
)( mn > , total emissions in situation 3, 3G  will be lower than 1G , the total emissions 
when none of the countries is altruistic.  That is, 13 GG < . Welfares of non-altruistic 
countries i in situations 1 and 3 are represented by )()( 11 Gwxv ii +  and 
)()( 33 Gwxv ii +  respectively.  
 
 Since 13 GG < , )()()()( 13 GwxvGwxv ii +<+  as iw  function is 
nondecreasing. Welfares of non-altruistic countries j in situations 1 and 3 are 
represented by )()( 11 Gwxv jj +  and )()(
33 Gwxv jj +  respectively.  Similarly, since 
13
jj xx >  from Proposition 16, this implies that )()(
13
jj xvxv >  as v function is 
nondecreasing. As 13 GG < , this implies that )()( 13 GwGw jj <  since jw  function is 
nonincreasing. Therefore, we will have )()()()( 1133 GwxvGwxv ijij +>+ . Therefore, 
non-altruistic countries i will be worse off while non-altruistic countries j are made 
better off in situation 3 as compared to situation 1 — the situation that none of the 
countries is altruistic.  
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4.4 Total emissions when there are two altruistic countries instead of only one 
 
We can easily infer that when there are two altruistic countries i while the rest of the 
world are non-altruistic, the resulting total emissions will even be lower as compared 
to the level in the situation that we have only one altruistic country i. Hence, non-
altruists of countries i are much worse off while the rest of the non-altruistic countries 
j are much better off. Similarly, consider instead that there are two altruistic countries 
j, the total emissions level is even lower when we have only one altruistic country j.  
  
The point is that when we have more altruistic countries, non-altruists of one 
type will be much better off and the non-altruists of the other type will be even worse 
off; this outcome is not Pareto optimal as some are better off while some are worse 
off. However, we will demonstrate in section 4.5 that only when all countries are 
altruistic will the total emissions be Pareto optimal. 
 
 
4.5 When we have altruistic countries i and j in the world 
 
When there are altruistic countries i and j in the world, we can easily infer from 
Propositions 14 and 16 that the resulting total emissions level will be lower as 
compared to the level when all countries are non-altruistic. Propositions 17 to 20 
below will prove that only when all countries are altruistic will total emissions level 





Proposition 17:  Let ixˆ  and jxˆ  represent the emissions of countries i and j when they 
are altruistic. Emissions for altruistic countries i and j are equal. That is, xxx ji ~ˆˆ == . 
 

















































 It follows from the strict concavity of the v, wi and wj functions that 
xxx ji ~ˆˆ == .  
 
Proposition 18: Let *ix  and 
*
jx  represent the Pareto optimal (P.O.) emissions. The 
Pareto optimal emissions of countries i and j are equal when all countries are 
altruistic. That is, * * *i jx x x= = . 
 
Proof: The Pareto optimal solutions are given by solving for the emissions levels that 
will maximize the social planner’s optimization problem. When all countries are 
altruistic, a social planner’s optimization problem will be: 
 

























The first-order conditions to (4.15) for countries i and j are the same when all 
countries are altruistic. Therefore, the emissions levels for altruistic countries i and j 
are equal.  
 
From Propositions 17 and 18, 4G , the total emissions when we have l altruistic 
countries i and k altruistic countries j are given by: 
 
(4.16)  xkxknxlxlmG ji ~)(~)(
4 +−++−=  
 
where ix  and jx  are the emissions for countries i and j when they are non-altruistic 
and x~  represents the emissions of countries i and  j when they are altruistic. 
 
 
*G , the Pareto optimal total emissions are given by: 
 
(4.17)  **** )( xnmnxmxG ji +=+=  
 
 
Proposition 19: Emissions of altruistic countries i and j, x~  are equal to the Pareto 
optimal levels only when all countries are altruistic. That is, *x x=% . 
 
Proof: When all countries are altruistic, the first-order conditions of altruistic 
countries i and j lead to the same solution to the social planner’s optimization problem 
in (4.15).  
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Proposition 20: Total emissions, 4G  when we have l altruistic countries i and k 
altruistic countries j will not be Pareto optimal unless all countries are altruistic, that 
is, ml =  and nk = . 
 
Proof: As we have more and more altruistic countries in the world, that is as l and k 
increase in equation (4.16), total emissions will still not be Pareto optimal. When  
ml =  and nk = , we have xnm ~)( + . Propositions 17-20 imply that 
**4 )(~)( GxnmxnmG =+=+= .  
 
 This proposition has an intuitive interpretation: when the countries are 
altruistic, they will take into account how their emissions affect each other, hence, 
when all are altruistic, the outcome will be Pareto optimal.  
 
 
4.5.1 Welfares of countries i and j when all countries are altruistic 
 
When all countries are altruistic, the actual allocations correspond to the Pareto 
optimal allocations and the welfares of all countries are maximized. This means that 
no countries are better off or worse off and this is an efficient outcome.
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5 Summary and some concluding remarks 
 
5.1 Summary  
 
Global warming has been regarded as a global public bad in most studies. However, 
new evidence shows that some countries may actually benefit from increased 
agricultural produce through a warmer temperature.  This warrants a new type of 
analysis. In this thesis, we assume that global warming is not necessarily a global 
public bad and for some countries, global warming may be instead a public good. We 
also assume that some or all countries may be altruistic — in the sense that they may 
have concern for other countries’ welfare. We examine the implications of these 
assumptions and compare the actual emissions levels of each country with the 
respective Pareto optimal levels in a two-country model.  
 
 We then extend our analysis to a multi-country model where one type of 
countries are hurt by global warming while the other type benefit from it. We consider 
the impact on total emission levels as we have more and more altruistic countries. We 
also examine the effect on welfare of each type of country. Specifically, we analyze 
who will benefit and who will lose by the action(s) of the altruist(s). We also assume 
that there are more countries that are harmed by global warming rather than benefit 
from it and each unit of emissions harms a country more than it benefits the other type 
of country. When there are one or more altruistic countries, we find that total 
emissions are lower even though the remaining non-altruists that are hurt by global 
warming increase its emissions as a response to the reduction of emissions by the 
altruist(s). Non-altruists of those countries that are harmed by global warming gain 
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while the other type of non-altruists (those that benefit from global warming) lose by 
the action(s) of the altruist(s). The total emission level will be Pareto optimal only 
when all countries in the world are altruistic. 
 
 
5.2 Concluding remarks 
 
 The study of altruism in the area of economics is still at a premature stage and 
it is clear from this thesis that assuming some or all countries are altruistic gives an 
interesting and a different perspective to the old environmental problem. Recognizing 
that global warming may benefit some countries is useful since the existing pool of 
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